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The "Stunning" Truth:
Stun Belts Debilitate, They Prejudice,
and They May Even Kill
Philip H. Yoon*
L Introduction
Brian Hill ("Hill") was sitting in an Alameda County, California, courthouse
on July 7, 1998, when he suddenly flipped over backwards, tumbled from his
chair, and convulsed on the floor for several seconds.' Hill was representing
himself during the jury selection phase of his assault trial when potential jurors
saw him fall to the ground and convulse.2 Hill was sent to the hospital to have
his heart monitored.3
Hill's convulsions did not occur because of a seizure. Rather, an Alameda
County sheriff's deputy leaned over a chair and accidentally triggered the remote
control of the stun belt that the sheriffs department put on Hill before his
appearance in court.4 The incident occurred only days after another California
judge ordered that a courtroom deputy shock Ronnie Hawkins, a defendant who
was wearing a stun belt, because he was interrupting her and disrupting the
court. 5
* J.D. Candidate, May 2004, Washington and Lee School of Law; B.A., University of
Pennsylvania. The author would like to express his deep gratitude to his family for their constant
support and love; Professor Roger D. Groot for his invaluable guidance; and to the students of the
Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse. The author would like to thank, in particular, Kathryn
Nichols Roe Eldridge and Damien P. DeLaney for their wisdom and for enhancing the integrity
of this Article, and Kristen F. Grunewald, Janice L. Kopec, and Lee Goebes for their editorial
insights.
1. Kelly Flaherty, Stun-Belt Incident in Alameda Courtroom: Sheiffs Call Shock Accidental;
DefendantAlkges Retaliation, THE RECORDER, July 13,1998, at 1, WL 7/13/1998 RECORDER-SF1;
Stun Belt Shocks Another Defendant, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, July 14, 1998, at A4.
2. Flaherty, supra note 1, at 1.
3. Id.
4. Henry K. Lee, 50,000 Volts Jolts Defendant in Oakland; Stun-Belt W1as Accidentally Acvated,
Deputies Say, S.F. CHRON., July 14,1998, at A13, 1998 WL 3918349.
5. Flaherty, supra note 1, at 1; Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1248
(C.D. Cal. 1999) ("Hawkins P'); see also Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 251 F.3d 1230, 1233, 1242
(9th Cir. 2001) ("Hawkins I1' (holding that broad injunction to prevent use of stun belts is
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These two incidents in the California courts are examples of a growing
trend-the use of stun belts during trials. In Hill's case, the stun belt was triggered
without any provocation by the defendant, while in Hawkins's, the judge ordered
the shock because the defendant was being disruptive.6 Trial courts might use
stun belts in place of, or sometimes even in conjunction with, other forms of
restraint such as handcuffs or shackles.7 Unfortunately, courts in many states
have sparse case law to guide them because stun belts are relatively new devices.
8
This Article explores the holdings of various appellate courts regarding the
use of stun belts and advocates reasons why stun belts should not be used in any
court proceeding, particularly in capital proceedings. Specifically, this Article
examines the reasons why several state courts have either banned or severely
restricted the use of stun belts in the courtroom. Part II briefly describes the
actual stun belt and its intended physical and psychological effects on the
wearer.9 Part III examines "accidental" discharges of the belt and the effects
such "accidents" may have on a defendant. Part IV reviews the most recent state
rulings regarding usage of stun belts in the courtroom. Part V briefly explores
the use, or non-use, of stun belts in other countries. Finally, Part VI discusses
how a defense attorney can protect her client when a court or law enforcement
agency proposes putting the stun belt on the defendant.'
improper if safety of courtroom is in question). The United States District Court for the Central
District of California granted a preliminary injunction that prohibited the Los Angeles County
Sheriff from placing stun belts on any prisoner in its custody pending the outcome of the prisoner's
trial. Hawkins I, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1262. The Ninth Circuit in Hawkins II held only that a district
court may not issue a broad injunction against stun belts without findings to support its decision.
Hawkins II, 251 F.3d at 1242. The Ninth Circuit, however, allowed a district court to issue an
injunction if it found that the belt was used for non-security purposes. Id. at 1243. The Ninth
Circuit also noted that the trial judge who ordered the activation of the belt later stated that she was
afraid Hawkins would attack someone in the courtroom. Id. at 1233 n.2. The Ninth Circuit,
however, did not find such concerns in the transcript. Id. Presumably, then, the Ninth Circuit
disapproved of this trial judge's use of the stun belt against Hawkins.
6. See Flaherty, supra note 1; Hawkins II, 251 F.3d at 1233 n.2.
7. See United States v. Durham, 287 F.3d 1297, 1308 (11 th Cir. 2002) ("Durbam P') (stating
that Durham wore both stun belt and leg shackles during his trial even though trial court did not
attempt to determine if leg shackles alone would be sufficient).
8. See Shelley A. Nieto Dahlberg, Comment, The REACT Securio Belt: Stunning Pnsoners and
Human Rights Groups into Questioning IWhether Its Use is Permissible Under the United States and Texas
Constitutions, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 239, 246 n.28 (1998) (stating that stun belts were first introduced
to criminal justice system in 1993) (citingJane Meredith Adams, Courtroom Shocker Use of Stun Belts
on Prisoners CritidZed, NEWSDAY, Aug. 16, 1998, at A19, 1998 WL 2681573).
9. Dahlberg's Comment regarding stun belts examines the physical and psychological
effects in detail. Seegeneraly Dahlberg, supra note 8. Because the stun belts used by today's courts
are substantially the same as those described by Dahlberg, Part II simply will summarize the
information in Dahlberg's Comment for the benefit of the reader.
10. The use of stun belts on defendants during trial obviously implicates the defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights and Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment concerns. See U.S.
CONST. amend. VI (stating defendant's rights); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (forbidding cruel and
STUN BELTS
II. The Stun Belt
I woke up a short time later to very intense shocking pain running
through my body. This electrical current was so intense that I thought
that I was actually dying. I had not been causing any trouble, I was
belly chained, shackled, seat belted in, and there was a fence between
the officers and me, so there was absolutely no reason for them to be
using this device on me .... Once I was in the cell, several officers
came into the cell and again I was shocked by the stun-belt. This
electrical blast knocked me to the floor.. ."
"Electricity speaks every language known to man. No translation
necessary. Everybody is afraid of electricity, and rightfully so.""
Before one can determine whether courts should use stun belts, it is impor-
tant to understand the nature of the device. The belt that courts use most often
is the Remote Electronically Activated Control Technology ("REACT') belt,
which is manufactured by Stun-Tech, Inc. 3 The belt is placed over the defen-
dant's waist, and prongs that are connected to two nine-volt batteries are at-
tached to the defendant over the left kidney area.14 The belt is designed to
deliver a 45,000-50,000-volt shock for eight seconds when activated by a remote
unusual punishment). Dahlberg's Comment explores these concerns in detail; therefore, these
concerns, although extremely important, will not be further discussed in this Article. See generaly
Dahlberg, supra note 8.
11. United States of Ameica, Cruely in Control? The Stun Belt and Other Eketro-Shock Equpment
in Law Enforcement, AMNESTY INT'L, June 1999, at 27, http://www.web.aninesty.org/aidoc/
aidocpdf.nsf/index/AMR510541999ENGLISH/$File/AMR5105499.pdf [hereinafter Cruely in
ControA (quoting inmate Thomas Shelton) (emphasis omitted).
12. Nicole Sterghos, Shocking RestraintAttracts Crticisrn, SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 4, 1998, at 1 A,
1998 WL 3243873 (quoting Dennis Kaufman, president of Stun-Tech, Inc.).
13. Dahlberg, sapra note 8, at 242-43. Another type of belt used commonly is the Remotely
Activated Custody Control ("RACC") belt. See Crudey in Control, supra note 11, at 6 (stating that
REACT and RACC devices were only stun belts in use at 1999); see also Rick Minter, Remote-Control
Stun Belt Debuts in Clayton Court, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 9, 1992, at D2, 1992 WL 4641607
(stating that RACC belt was placed on capital murder defendant). Interestingly enough, the defense
attorney in the Georgia case favored the stun belt over leg irons or other forms of restraint. Minter,
supra, at D2. The attorney stated, "I like it because the jury doesn't see my client in handcuffs."
Id. This case, however, took place in 1992, when very little was known about stun belts or of their
existence. Id. Defense attorneys today may need to decide what form of restraint is the lesser of
two evils for their clients.' See infra, Part VI (examining decisions defense attorneys must make when
faced with possible usage of stun belt).
14. Dahlberg, supra note 8, at 247.
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control that is within 300 feet of the belt.'5 Once someone activates the belt, that
person cannot stop the shock manually; the shock will last for the full eight
seconds. 6
The force of the shock knocks most wearers to the ground.'7 The victim
may shake uncontrollably and could remain incapacitated for up to fifteen
minutes.'8 Some victims have suffered more severe or long-term effects, such
as muscular weakness for thirty to forty-five minutes, immediate and uncon-
trolled defecation and urination, welts on the skin that require as long as six
months to heal, heartbeat irregularities, and seizures.'9 Furthermore, the stun
belt could cause more severe injuries:
For one thing, some at-risk hearts appear healthy. "You shock some-
one with 50,000 volts of electricity and that person has some unrecog-
nized congenital problem or conduction mechanism in their heart, and
you put them at great risk for arhythmia [sic]," says Armand Start, a
medical doctor who runs the National Center for Correctional
Healthcare Studies. "You can't predict this. You can't determine the
conduction mechanism in a heart. Arhythmia [sic] mostly happens in
healthy hearts."2
Stun-Tech itself has stated that the belt has strong psychological effects on
the wearer. A Stun-Tech distributor advertised the stun belts as creating a "very
psychological" effect, and that "at trials, people notice that the defendant wil be
watching whoever has the monitor."'2' In fact, one publication has quoted Stun-
Tech as saying that " '[o]ne of the great advantages [of the stun belt] ... is its
capacity to humiliate the wearer.' "' The stun belt's intended use, therefore, is
to control the mind of the defendant.' One court has even compared the effects
15. Id. at 247, 247 n.40.
16. See Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179,1193 (nd. 2001) (citing Stopping the Torture Trade,
AMNESTY INT'L, 2001, at 28, http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidocpdf.nsf/index/
ACT400022001ENGLISH/$File/ACT4000201.pd) (examining characteristics of stun belts).
17. Dahlberg, supra note 8, at 248 (citing Anne-Marie Cusac, Stunning Technology: Corrrections
Cowboys Get a Charge Out of Their Sd.Fi Weapony, THE PROGRESSIVE, July 1, 1996, at 18, 1996 WL
9254174).
18. Id. (citing Cusac, supra note 17).
19. See People v. Mar, 52 P.3d 95, 103 (Cal. 2002) (quoting People v. Mar, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d
771, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)) (examining characteristics of stun belts).
20. Cusac, supra note 17.
21. Id.
22. Mar, 52 P.3d at 111 n.8 (quoting William F. Schulz, Cruel & Unusual Punishment, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS, Apr. 24, 1997, at 51).
23. See id. (discussing magazine article that described stun belt's promotional materials as
stating:
[O]ne of the great advantages [of the stun belt], the company says, is its capacity to
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of stun belts to "the forced administration of antipsychotic medication to a
criminal defendant in advance of, and during, trial."
'24
A final concern is the potential physical impact that the mental effects of
the belt can cause. The president of Stun-Tech in 1996 stated, "We don't
recommend that [the stun belt] be placed on anyone who has a heart condition.
The reason is that, if they have to wear it for eight hours, there's a tremendous
amount of anxiety. The fear will elevate blood pressure as much as the shock
will."" These concerns, however, indicate only the potential mental effects before
any shock occurs. If the thought of an officer pushing the button at the slightest
indiscretion is terrifying to the defendant, one can only imagine the fear of a
defendant who has been shocked unexpectedly.
III. 'Acddental" Discharges and Their Effects
Jeffrey Remington was convicted in 2000 of capital murder.26 On August
24, 2000, at 8:30 a.m., the jury was thirty minutes away from continuing its
deliberations in the penalty phase of trial.2 7 At that time, Remington was waiting
for his counsel when his stun belt accidentally shocked him.28 Remington was
taken to the hospital and therefore was absent from court during jury delibera-
tions.2 Remington made a motion to set aside the verdict because he was not
present during deliberations, but the court denied his motion.3"
humiliate the wearer. "'After all, if you were wearinga contraption around your waist
that by the mere push of a button in someone else's hand could make you defecate or
urinate yourself,' the brochure asks, 'what would that do to you from the psychological
standpoint?'"
(quoting Schulz, supra note 22, at 51)).
24. Id. at 112. The Mar court admitted that the medical and psychological risks of the
involuntary use of stun belts were not as well established as those risks associated with
antipsychotic drugs. Id. The two situations raised enough of the same concerns, however, for the
court to question seriously the belt's effect on a defendant's ability to adequately defend him- or
herself at trial. Id; see also infra Part IV.B (describing Mads effect on use of stun belts in California).
25. Cusac, supra note 17. Some courts state that, although the voltage may appear high, the
amperage of the discharge is low, which should cause minimal pain. See United States v. Durham,
219 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1238 (N.D. Fla. 2002) ("Durham I'" (discussing characteristics of stun belt).
Evidence of actual discharges, however, indicate that the pain is much more than "minimal." See
Flaherty, supra note 1 (reporting on case of Brian Hill, who convulsed and was sent to hospital after
stun belt discharged).
26. Remington v: Commonwealth, 551 S.E.2d 620, 624 (Va. 2001).
27. Id. at 635.
28. Id; see also Tim Harrington, Jury Recommends Death for Remington, THE DAILY NEWS
LEADER, Aug. 25, 2000, at 1A (stating that spokesman from Virginia Department of Corrections
claimed that stun belt "was accidentally activated by a corrections officer").
29. Remington, 551 S.E.2d at 635.
30. Id at 636. The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the conviction and the denial of
Remington's motion because his counsel agreed to allow the jury to deliberate in Remington's
absence. Id. The court noted further that the defendant would have been held in custody during
deliberations anyway. Id.
2003]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2
Remington's example illustrates the potential problems which could arise
if a defendant is shocked during trial. The problems become even more of a
concern if the shock occurs during an important part of trial. Brian Hill was
shocked during jury selection.3" Roy Hollaway was shocked during closing
arguments of the penalty phase of his trial.3 2  According to 1998 statistics,
approximately forty-three percent of actual activations of stun belts were acci-
dental; in other words, the activation was in no way caused by actions of the
defendant.33 These cases illustrate why any defendant should be concerned if she
is forced to wear a stun belt.
Another potential concern is whether many of these "accidental discharges"
were actually accidents. In most cases, a police or court officer controls the
remote control device.' In many cases, these are the very people, rather than the
judge, who decided that the defendant needed to wear the belt.35 Although the
judge instructs the officers to activate the stun belts on her command, the
officers do not always follow the judge's command.36 There have been the
occasional, isolated incidents in which an overzealous police officer reacted
poorly to a defendant or prisoner.37 The system often justifies the use of stun
belts by requiring a judge to give the shock order, but it is the person holding the
remote who actually wields all the power.3"
31. See Flaherty, supra note 1 (reporting on Hill's case); see also supra Part I (discussing Hill's
shock).
32. Hollaway v. State, 6 P.3d 987, 993 (Nev. 2000); see infra Part IV.D (describing Hollaway
case).
33. Dahlberg, supra note 8, at 289. But see Durham II, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 1239 (stating that
of forty-five activations, eleven were accidental, with seven of eleven accidental activations having
occurred before plastic guard was installed over activation button). The court failed to note how
many of the total activations occurred after the installation of plastic guards. This failure makes a
comparison of accidental activation to total activation after installation of the plastic guard
impossible.
34. See Durham 1, 287 F.3d at 1301 ("The belt is controlled by a remote device held by a
security official in the courtroom.").
35. See State v. Flieger, 955 P.2d 872, 872-73 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting trial court's
statement that it would defer to judgment of Sheriff's Office to determine if shock device should
be used on defendant); see also Cruedo in Control, supra note 11, at 16 (stating that in many jurisdic-
tions, sheriff's office makes initial decision to fit defendant with stun belt).
36. SeeJohn Gibeaut, StunBetsPuton Tral, A.B.A.J., Dec. 2002, at 16 (describing case where
sheriff's deputies did not put stun belt nor any other restraint on defendant despite judge's order
to fit defendant with stun belt).
37. See CrueG in Control, supra note 11, at 27 (quoting inmate who said he was shocked while
he was sleeping, that he was later shocked again without provocation, and that officers were
"laughing and making jokes" after administering the shock).
38. For example, it is very easy for someone in possession of the remote to activate the
shock belt and then simply claim it was an accident. See Harrington, supra note 28 (stating that
spokes-person from Virginia Department of Corrections claimed that belt was accidentally activated
by officer).
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IV. Recent Rulings in Various States
Courts in a variety of jurisdictions have reacted differently to the use of stun
belts in the courtroom. Because stun belts are new, some jurisdictions have
relied on the case law of other states that have used stun belts for a longer period
of time, while some jurisdictions have addressed the problem independently.
The following part describes some of the more prominent cases involving stun
belts. The cases are listed in order of the most to least restrictive rulings.
A. Indiana: Conpkte Ban
Matthew Wrinkles was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in
Indiana.3 9 Before his trial, the trial court told his counsel that he would need to
choose between Wrinkles wearing the stun belt or wearing shackles.4" Wrinkles's
attorney chose the stun belt because he thought the jurors would see shackles,
but would not see the belt." Wrinkles appealed his conviction and argued that
his counsel was ineffective because he chose the stun belt.42
The Supreme Court of Indiana held that, from that point on, stun belts
would not be permissible in Indiana state courtrooms.43 The court found that
other forms of restraint would serve the same purposes "without inflicting the
mental anguish that results from simply wearing the stun belt and the physical
pain that results if the belt is activated."'  Indiana's simple policy, therefore, is
the most restrictive in that it no longer allows stun belts in its courtrooms.
B. Cakfornia: VirtualBan
Ronnie Hawkins filed a class-action suit in the United States District Court
for the Central District of California on behalf of all persons in the custody of
the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, future defendants of the Los
Angeles courts, and any person forced to wear a stun belt, and for an injunction
39. Winkks, 749 N.E.2d at 1185; see IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-3(b)(1)(A) (Michie Supp.
2002) (allowing for punishment of death for murder conviction).
40. Wrinkles, 749 N.E.2d at 1195.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 1194 (holding that "henceforth stun belts may not be used on defendants in the
courtrooms of this State."). Unfortunately for Wrinkles, he was not able to use this argument to
his advantage because he alleged ineffectiveness of counsel for this claim. Id. at 1195. The
standard for stun belts by the Supreme Court of Indiana was not established when Wrinkles's
counsel made his decision. Id. Wrinkles's counsel testified that he did not object because both he
and co-counsel believed that the trial court would make Windes wear shackles instead. Id.
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Indiana found that Wrinkles did not sufficiently demonstrate that
his counsel's performance constituted ineffective assistance. Id. Seegeneral Strickland v. Washing-
ton, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (setting forth standard for ineffective assistance of counsel).
44. WItinkles, 749 N.E.2d at 1195.
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to prevent any Los Angeles court or the Los Angeles Sheriffs Department from
using stun belts.45 Hawkins brought this action after the trial judge ordered a
court official to shock him because he was disruptive in the courtroom. 6 The
district court granted his motions for class certification and preliminary injunc-
tion.47 The district court's ruling forbade the Los Angeles County Sheriff from
seeking a judicial order to place or activate a stun belt on any prisoner in his
custody pending the outcomes of any of those prisoners' trials.4" The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part and remanded for
modification of the injunction, which it found to be overly broad.49 The Ninth
Circuit, rather than banning stun belts outright, conducted a balancing test
between the safety of the court, which included its personnel, and a defendant's
rights.5 ° The Ninth Circuit stated that the more the issue becomes one of
security and less of disruption, the more stun belts become "less prejudicial and
the alternatives more so."'" However, even though the Ninth Circuit ultimately
remanded to the district court because the injunction was overly broad, the
Ninth Circuit's language implied that it would require specific findings, on the
record, of a trial court's justification for using a stun belt.52
45. Hawkins 1, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1249 (describing Hawkins's lawsuit and request for prelimi-
nary injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against use of stun belts by any Los Angeles County
Municipal or Superior Court judge or by Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department); see also supra
Part I (describing judge's order to shock Hawkins for being disruptive). Hawkins was convicted
of felony burglary and theft charges. Hawkins 1, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1248. Hawkins allegedly made
threats of violence to the court, so the court ordered the Los Angeles County Sheriff to place a stun
belt on Hawkins during a motion hearing and for his sentencing. Id. Hawkins was disruptive and
spoke out of turn, so the judge ordered the courtroom deputy to activate the belt Id. Hawkins
brought suit and sought a preliminary injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the use of stun
belts by any Los Angeles County Municipal or Superior Court judge or by the Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department. Id. at 1249.
46. Hawkins 1, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1248.
47. Id. at 1263.
48. Id. at 1262.
49. Hawkins II, 251 F.3d at 1242-43 (stating that injunction was overly broad because it
banned use of stun belts for courtroom security purposes).
50. Id. at 1240.
51. Id. at 1242.
52. See id. at 1233 n.2 (stating that it did not see trial judge's latter claim of concern of danger
in the transcript). The district court later dissolved the preliminary injunction after Hawkins
submitted the Sheriff's Department's revised stun belt policy. Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, No.
CV9805605 DDP, 2002 WL 227081, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2002). The revised policy restricted
use of stun belts to situations of documented attempts or actual escapes from custody, documented
violent behavior while in custody, a history of attacks on peace officers, corrections officers,
courtroom personnel, or courtroom occupants, or threats of violence toward any victim, witness,
courtroom personnel, or courtroom occupant. Id. Furthermore, the revised policy restricted
activation of the belt to situations of actual or threatened acts of violence, attempted escapes by the
defendant, or any attempt to disable or remove the device. Id. The district court determined that
the revised policy specifically prohibited activation of stun belts solely for verbal disruptions and
that it complied with federal law. Id. The district court, therefore, dissolved the preliminary
STUN BELTS
The Supreme Court of California decided Peopk v. Ma5 3 the next year and
issued an opinion with more specific holdings.5 4 The defendant, James Mar
("Mar"), did not wear a stun belt during the first day of trial testimony, and the
prosecution was able to present testimony without disruptions or incidents from
Mar.5 On the morning of the second day of testimony, Mar's counsel told the
court that Mar was now wearing the stun belt and that it was "making him very,
very nervous and agitated." 6 The court talked to Mar and his defense counsel.5 7
Mar's counsel eventually stated that Mar was willing to wear the stun belt during
most of the trial, but that he wanted the belt removed during his testimony.5"
The court deferred its decision and proceeded through the rest of the day
without incident from Mar. 9 The next day, the court decided to keep the belt
on Mar, stating:
I think the belt's the best insurance that he has that he will comport
himself appropriately in the courtroom... so I think in all fairness to
him, given the volatility of some of the situations he's found himself
in and how he's responded, the Court's of the opinion it's in his best
interest, in the time that he is testifying and the remainder of the trial,
that the belt remain on... 6o
Mar demonstrated a few instances of excitement while testifying, but he was able
to testify to his version of the events, and the trial proceeded without any
activation of the belt.6'
injunction. Id.
53. 52 P.3d 95 (Cal. 2002).
54. See Mar, 52 P.3d at 98 (holding that trial courts must consider whether use of proposed
stun belt is justified over using a lower voltage belt with a shortened duration and that trial courts
should lean more towards using more traditional physical restraints because of the number of
accidental activations).
55. Id. at 100.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 100-01.
58. Id. at 101.
59. Id. at 102.
60. Mar, 52 P.3d at 102. Notably, the trial court did not make the original decision to put
the stun belt on Mar
So the bailiff and the security people are concerned that for whatever reason you do
have strong emotions and you feel those emotions-that's not unusual-but in your
situation, because of what happened at Taft and because of an incident, I guess, that
happened several-well, a month or so ago in the courthouse in the transportation
situation, you got crossways with somebody in the security detail-and I don't know
anything about that other than the fact that something did happen...
Id. at 101. In fact, the court appeared to have little information and only very vague ideas on which
to base its decision.
61. Id. at 102.
2003]
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The Supreme Court of California noted that the issue of stun belt use in
California courtrooms was a matter of first impression.62 It would therefore
decide not only whether stun belts would be available in only the same limited
circumstances as other physical restraints, but also whether there were features
and aspects of stun belts that were distinct enough to require the trial court to
consider additional factors before it could require a defendant to wear one.63 The
court first reaffirmed that defendants could not be subjected to physical re-
straints of any kind in the courtroom while in the presence of the jury unless
there was a" 'showing of a manifest need for such restraints.' ,6 It then stated
that its prior holdings on physical restraints applied also to stun belts.6" It found
that even though stun belts might not be visible to a jury, their potential effect
on a defendant's mental state meant that the same standards and procedural
requirements for other physical restraints applies also to stun beks.66 The court
found that the trial court's decision was based on its determination that the stun
belt was in Mar's best interest and not that Mar posed a danger to the
courtroom.67 As a result, the trial court failed to demonstrate a "manifest need"
for using the stun belt over Mar's objection."
The Mar court created a virtual ban on stun belts in the California state
courts.6 9 Trial courts first must consider all of the physical and psychological
consequences of using the stun belt.7" The trial court then must find that the belt
is "safe and appropriate under the particular circumstances."7 1 The Supreme
Court of California now directs that stun belts must be "the least restrictive
device that will serve the court's security interest."72 Because the Mar standard
requires such a great amount of detail, a hearing on a motion to compel or
prohibit the use of stun belts necessarily would take an enormous amount of
62. Id. at 97.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 104 (quoting People v. Duran, 545 P.2d 1322, 1327 (Cal. 1976) (discussing
circumstances in which "manifest need" for physical restraints may appear)).
65. Id. at 106.
66. Mar, 52 P.3d at 106; see Duran, 545 P.2d at 1327 (holding that defendants cannot be
subjected to physical restraints in courtroom while in presence of jury unless "manifest need" for
restraints is shown).
67. Mar, 52 P.3d at 109.
68. Id.
69. See id. (stating that trial court must make specific findings of "manifest need" for stun
belts).
70. Id. at 112-13.
71. Id. at 113-14.
72. Id. at 113.
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time.73 It seems unlikely that trial courts would engage in such a laborious
process when other forms of restraint would be easier to impose."
The Mar decision, therefore, appears to create a virtual ban on stun belts in
California. Mar, however, has not deterred at least one trial court in San Diego.7"
Christopher Butler sought a new trial on the ground that the stun belt he was
forced to wear during the trial made him too nervous to testify effectively in his
own defense.76 The trial judge wanted Butler to wear the stun belt because he
had tried to escape from jail "and was facing life in prison if convicted."" At a
post-conviction hearing, Butler testified "that he was terrified a shock could kill
him if he made a mistake, or if the sheriff's deputy who held the remote control
to the stun belt set it off accidentally."" The trial judge, however, considered
Butler's trial testimony to be "among the best" she had heard and thought that
"[hie was as conversational as any defendant I have ever seen as a lawyer or a
judge."79 If this case is appealed, the decision of the California appellate courts
could determine whether Mar creates a virtual ban on stun belts in California.'
C. Washington-Trial Court, Not the Police, Deddes
Phillip Flieger ("Flieger") was on trial for murder when, during voir dire, he
asked the court to order that the "shock box" he was wearing be removed.8 The
court stated:
73. Mar, 52 P.3d at 112-14 (listing some factors trial courts must consider before approving
use of stun belt).
74. See Duran, 545 P.2d at 1327 (stating that defendant cannot be subjected to physical
restraints in jury's presence unless court makes finding of "manifest need" because of possible
prejudice in jurors' minds, affront to human dignity, disrespect to judicial system, and effect
restraints may have on defendant's decision to testify). On the other hand, courts that are consider-
ing the use of stun belts must take the Duran factors into account in addition to the many physical
and physiological consequences that the Marcourt cited. Mar, 52 P.3d at 112-14. The court must
then apply the "safe and appropriate" standard. Id. at 113-14.
75. See Onell R. Soto,Judge Won't Give Robber a New Trial; Sentencing is SetforNext Month, SAN
DIEGO TRIB., Jan. 18, 2003, at NC1, 2003 WL 6561043 (reporting on case in which convicted





80. As of this writing, the record for Butler's case was not available. It is not known,
therefore, whether the trial court made detailed findings and whether it met the Mar standards.
81. State v. Flieger, 955 P.2d 872, 872 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). Neither the Fkeger opinion,
nor other Washington opinions, describe the "shock box" in any detail. It appears, however, that
the "shock box" is actually the REACT belt. See Stefano Esposito, Pasco Man's Murder Conviction
Overturned, Tu-CITY HERALD, June 26, 1998, http://www.tri-cityherald.com/news/oldnews/
1998/0626.html (stating that" 'shock box' ... [is] technically called Remote Electronic Activated
Control Technology").
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[The Court is not the one that determines the initial security precau-
tions, if you will, and the Court must defer to the Sheriff's Office in
that regard, and if the Sheriff's Office determines that it's necessary to
use the box, then unless shown otherwise, then the Court will respect
the wishes of the Sheriff's Office in that regard."2
Two jurors admitted to the court that they noticed the shock box on Flieger's
back and that they discussed it with each other.8 3 One of those jurors also stated
that "he saw the sheriff holding something" and that he thought it might have
been related to the shock box.' The court only asked the jurors to stop their
discussions of the shock box and allowed the trial to proceed while Flieger
continued to wear the shock box." Flieger was convicted of second-degree
felony murder.8 6
The Court of Appeals ofWashington reversed the conviction and remanded
for a new trial.8" According to the court, the trial court erred when it delegated
the determination of whether to impose restraints to the sheriff's office without
making any real determination of its own.8 The Court of Appeals of Washing-
ton also found the fact that several jurors noticed the shock box to be determina-
tive of potential prejudice to Flieger."9 Therefore, Washington appears to
require, at a minimum, the trial court to make the decision of whether to use the
stun belt.9°
It is important to note, however, that Washington's standard does not place
all of the burden on trial courts to make these findings. A few months after
Flieger was decided, the Court of Appeals of Washington found that a pro se
defendant improperly and untimely objected to the use of a shock belt.91 The
court took a disturbing turn from its analysis in Fieger and stated that "[tihe
foundation for Mr. Cobos's nervousness is speculation and is not based upon a
record of jury discussion about the restraint as was the case in Flieger [sic]. ' '92
Even though the trial court made no record of why Cobos was made to wear the
shock box or of who initially ordered the restraint, the court gave broad discre-
tion to the trial court because the trial court "did not clearly defer the decision
to the executive authorities or refuse to exercise its discretion as was the case in
82. Flieger, 955 P.2d at 872-73 (quoting trial court) (alteration in original).




87. Id. at 875.
88. Flieger, 955 P.2d at 874.
89. Id. at 874-75.
90. See id. at 873-75 (discussing trial court's duty to exercise its discretion of whether to
impose restraints).
91. State v. Cobos, No. 15749-1-III, 1998 WL 954608, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 1998)




Flieger [sic]." 93 The dissent disagreed and found that Cobos's statement of
nervousness "indicated the source of his concern and the prejudice he sought to
avoid," and that the trial court's failure to hold a hearing was an abuse of discre-
tion.94 The majority acknowledged that the trial court "may have erred" by its
failure to review the claim on the record, but it found that Cobos "prevented
adequate consideration" of the claim because his objection was not timely.9" This
burden on the defendant is not definitive because it is contained in an unpub-
lished opinion, but the decision at least provides some procedural warnings to
defendants and defense attorneys.
Other states also are requiring the judiciary, not law enforcement officials,
to make the stun belt decision. California, for example, requires the court to
determine specifically whether a manifest need exists for using a stun belt; the
court must make its own specific findings and "may not simply rely upon the
judgment of law enforcement or court security officers or the unsubstantiated
comments of others."" At the federal level, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit stated that "due to the novelty of this technology,
evidentiary hearings are almost certainly necessary before a decision to employ
a stun belt can be supported."'97 Because of the constitutional issues raised by the
use of stun belts, it is imperative that a judge, not a law enforcement officer,
make the decision of whether to use the stun belt.
D. Nevada-The Prejudice Standard
Roy Hollaway was convicted of first-degree murder for strangling his wife.98
In closing arguments during the penalty phase, when the prosecutor was describ-
ing how violent Hollaway was, the stun belt Hollaway was wearing was
activated.99 The shock to Holloway completely disrupted the proceedings." °
The court excused the jury and stated that it was "intolerable" that Hollaway was
shocked by accident when he was doing "absolutely nothing."'' The court
brought the jury back in and explained to it that Hollaway was wearing a stun
93. Id., at *7 ('We can not discern from this record exacdy why Mr. Cobos was made to wear
the shock box or what role the court or prosecution played in the initial decision making.").
94. Id., at *11 (Schultheis, C.J., dissenting).
95. Id., at *7. The majority, however, may have ruled in favor of the State because it
disapproved of defendants who act pro se. See id., at *8, *10 (stating that "Mr. Cobos acting pro
se may be considered to have either invited any error or waived it by failing to object in a proper
and timely fashion," and that "[t]his case well illustrates the folly of pro se representation"). One
also may conclude that procedural default is a crucial element to any analysis on appeal.
96. Mar, 52 P.3d at 107.
97. Durham, 287 F.3d at 1306-07 n.8.
98. Hollaway, 6 P.3d at 992.





belt and that he did nothing to warrant its activation. °2 The jury returned a
verdict of death, and the court imposed the sentence of death. 3
The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the conviction of guilt, but re-
versed his sentence and remanded for a new penalty hearing." The court stated
that "[t]he timing [of the belt's activation] could not have been better to reinforce
the image of Hollaway as an extremely violent man with whom authorities had
to take exceptional security precautions." ' The court also noted that the jail
recently acquired the stun belt and was testing it by routinely placing it on first-
degree murder defendants.0 6 The court, however, did not affirmatively state that
this incident alone was enough to reverse the death sentence. Rather, it stated
that the combination of the unprovoked shocking and an error in jury instruc-
tions constituted a violation of Hollaway's Eighth Amendment right to a fairly
imposed and reasonably consistent death penalty.0 7
E. Eleventh Circuit-Lack of Findings and the Government's Burden
Jeffery Durham was on trial for several felonies when courtroom security
decided that it needed to shackle Durham's legs and fit him with a stun belt
before bringing him into the courtroom.' The decision was based on Durham's
recent attempts to break out of jail."°9 Durham filed a motion to prohibit the use
of the stun belt and cited many arguments against using the stun belt."0 Just
before trial began, the court held a hearing, outside the presence of the jury, on
Durham's motion."' Durham's attorney reiterated the previous arguments, and
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Hollaway, 6 P.3d at 997.
105. Id. at 994.
106. Id. at 994 n.4.
107. Id. at 997; see also U.S. CONsT. Amend. VIII (forbidding imposition of cruel and unusual
punishment).
108. Durham I, 287 F.3d at 1301.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1301-02. Durham's arguments were substantially similar to those laid out at the
beginning of this Article. See supra Part II (listing numerous effects that stun belts have on
defendants). Durham claimed:
[MeOSt stun belt models were designed to administer from 50,000-70,000 volts of
tricity sustained over an eight-second period. Shock of that magnitude "typically
causes the recipient to lose control of his limbs, to fall to the ground, and often to
defecate or urinate upon himself."... Durham also argued that the stun belt interfered
with his rights to confer with counsel and to participate in his own defense. He
further noted that a stun belt may prejudice the defendant in front of the jury, as the
belt's presence may imply that the defendant is a violent individual that can only be
controlled through extraordinary means.
Durham, 287 F.3d at 1301-02; see also Dahlberg, supra note 8, at 246-53 (describing actual and
theoretical effects that stun belts have on defendants mentally and physically).
111. Durham 1, 287 F.3d at 1302.
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he also added that "he feared that Durham would be 'more concerned about
receiving such a jolt than he is about thinking about the testimony and giving me
aid and assistance in the defense of this case.",2 Durham's attorney also argued
that the stun belt was uncomfortable to Durham. 13
The court stated, "I don't know if it's interfering with your ability to com-
municate with [Durham]. He's right beside you and you can communicate with
him..."114 The court then briefly addressed two questions: whether the device
could be adjusted to make Durham more comfortable and whether there was any
possibility of an accidental discharge."' The only "evidence" the court received
about the possibility of accidental discharge was questions it asked of a deputy
marshal who was not under oath.' 6 The deputy marshal stated that each marshal
was trained in how the belt operates."7 The marshal also stated that there would
be no mistake, and that if the belt did go off, Durham was aware and advised of
the rules, regulations, and how it worked.' The court denied Durham's motion
with the conclusory findings that Durham was a heightened security risk and that
there was no rational basis for Durham to be apprehensive about the belt."9
The Eleventh Circuit vacated Durham's conviction and remanded to the
district court. 2 ° The Eleventh Circuit was concerned primarily about the lack of
findings by the district court in denying Durham's motion. 2 ' The court outlined
the mental effects of the stun belt and the potential fear Durham may have over
the use of the belt." The court then turned to questions that it felt must be
answered in a proper hearing with sworn testimony, as opposed to the unswom
testimony the district court received from the deputy marshal." Such questions
were:
Exactly what precautions does the Marshals Service take to ensure the
belt does not go off accidentally? What kind of training does the
deputy with the remote trigger receive? How is it relevant that after





116. Id.; see id. at 1302 n.4 (stating that deputy marshal was not under oath).
117. Durham 1, 287 F.3d at 1302-03.
118. Id. at 1303.
119. Id. The court made no factual findings about the operation of the stun belt or the
possibility of accidental discharge, and it made no explanation of why less severe restraints would
have been inadequate. Id.
120. Id. at 1309.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1305.
123. Durham I, 287 F.3d at 1307.
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pain, he is aware of 'the rules and regulations' of how the belt oper-
ates?
24
The court also stated that the trial court should have inquired into the criteria for
triggering the belt, as well as the force and effect of the shock, in addition to the
questions above.'2 ' The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court's lack
of concern over these questions constituted reversible error.'
26
The Eleventh Circuit's standard is not much different from the California
standard.127 The Eleventh Circuit, however, also indicated that the prosecution
bears a burden of proof when the district court abuses its discretion in stun belt
cases.' 28 The Government now must prove that the burdens on the defendant's
fundamental rights are harmless.2 9 The court was concerned particularly about
the possibility of a defendant being absent for a part of the trial due to the
activation of the stun belt. 3 ' The court found that the right to be present at his
or her trial and to participate in his or her defense are the key fundamental rights
affected by the use of stun belts.' 3' In order to counter a defendant's allegation
of prejudice in stun belt cases, therefore:
[I]t is not sufficient for the government to point out that the defen-
dant was represented by an attorney looking out for his interests, thus
rendering the defendant's presence or participation at trial unnecessary
... Nor is it sufficient for the government to argue that the defendant
cannot name any outcome-determinative issues or arguments that
would have been raised had he been able to participate at trial.'32
The court found that the Government could not rely solely on proof that an
attorney acted with the defendant's interests in mind because of the importance
of a defendant's active assistance at trial.'33 The court also found that the
Government may not transfer the burden of proof to the defendant and oblige
her to name the arguments she would have made had she been present.'34 The
court held that the trial court's order for Durham to wear the stun belt hampered
his ability to participate meaningfully throughout the trial.'35 Because the Gov-
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1306-07 n.8.
126. Id. at 1309.
127. See generally Mar, 52 P.3d at 95 (setting California's standard for use of stun belts in
courtroom). See also supra Part V.B (describing California standard after Ma).
128. Durham 1, 287 F.3d at 1308.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1308-09.
131. Id. at 1308.
132. Id. at 1308-09.
133. Id. at 1309.




ernment did not meet its burden, the court vacated and remanded for a new
trial.136
Durham's effect on Florida state courts is unclear. The Eleventh Circuit
stated that a stun belt "imposes substantial burdens upon a defendant's constitu-
tional rights.' 137  However, the district court, on remand, determined that the
stun belt, at least in Durham's case, did not interfere with his constitutional
rights. 3 ' Before Durham, the District Court of Appeal of Florida for the First
District stated that "[n]o formal hearing on the use of restraints is necessary, but
where there is a total lack of a hearing, the decision should be remanded for a
hearing."' 39 However, even though Durham's effect on Florida law is unclear, the
Durham opinion and the subsequent "lengthy hearing" by the district court
indicate that, at a minimum, substantial findings by the trial court are necessary
before a defendant will be required to wear a stun belt.4 °
136. Id. On remand, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida
denied Durham's amended motion to prohibit the use of stun belts at trial. Durham II, 219 F. Supp.
2d at 1242. The court conducted a lengthy evidentiary hearing on Durham's amended motion. Id.
at 1235. The court found "practically no risk" of accidental activation, "no threat" to Durham's
health, and "no likelihood of undue embarrassment or prejudice to the defendant." Id. at 1239.
,The court also determined that less restrictive security measures would not suffice because
"Durham possesses a rare combination of skill, ingenuity, cunning, and fearlessness." Id. at 1236.
In addition, the court found that the stun belt would not interfere with Durham's constitutional
rights because the belt was "well and fully covered by the defendant's coat," Durham "was alert and
actively participated, and consulted with his counsel throughout this five-hour hearing... during
which he wore the stun belt," and the Deputy Marshals were well-trained in the use of the belt. Id.
at 1240-41. The most troublesome finding by the district court, however, was its denial of Dur-
ham's request for "a medical evaluation to ensure that the device does not pose any unforseen
health problems to him." Id. at 1242. The court stated that the belt did not pose any health threat
to Durham because he "appears to be in excellent physical condition." Id. It also found no
exidence that he possessed or could possess any health conditions that could prohibit use of the
belt and that his health records from the Bureau of Prisons did "not reflect any medical condition
that would pose a health risk in this case." Id. The court also stated that "there is no evidence in
the record that the device is psychologically damaging to the defendant, even if not activated." Id.
It appears that the district court, in making its findings on the record, has shifted the burden of
proof once again to defendants. See id. (listing failures of proof by Durham). Durham was
convicted of his crimes soon after the district court's decision; his lawyers indicated that there were
plans to appeal. Robber Could Serve Time Undeground, PENSACOLA NEWS J., Aug. 31, 2002, at 1C,
2002 WL 24846177. As of this writing, the Eleventh Circuit has not ruled on the district court's
new ruling.
137. Durham 1, 287 F.3d at 1309.
138. Durham II, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 1240-41.
139. Childers v. State, 782 So. 2d 513, 518 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (remanding for hearing
to determine if counsel was ineffective for failing to object to use of stun belt without hearing).
140. See Durham I, 287 F.3d at 1309 (holding that trial court must make substantial findings
before requiring defendant to wear stun belt); Durham II, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 1235 (stating that
district court conducted "lengthy evidentiary hearing" to determine whether Durham may be
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F. Viginia-To Be Determined?
As of this writing, Remington v. Commonwealth 4' is the only reported case in
Virginia that involves the use of stun belts.'42 Remington, however, addressed the
stun belt issue only tangentially in deciding whether defendants have a constitu-
tional right to be present in the courtroom while the jury is deliberating in
another room.'43 Remington did not address the actual issue of stun belts them-
selves.'"
Neither the federal district courts in Virginia, nor the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, nor the United States Supreme Court have
addressed the issue. As of now, there are no actual standards in Virginia for trial
courts to follow in determining whether to use stun belts on defendants at trial.
The lack of case law and standards gives defense attorneys all the more reason
to plan carefflly any objection to the use of stun belts.
V. Use (or Non-Use) in Other Countries
"[The Committee Against Torture] recommended that the United
States abolish electro-shock stun belts and restraint chairs as methods
"~145of restraining those in custody ....
Attorneys will sometimes use international standards to strengthen their
arguments against certain policies or statutes. 146 If the attorney uses international
standards as her only argument, she will argue that the policy or statute often
violates norms of international law, orjus cogens.'47 This argument, by itself, will
not succeed, but an international norms argument used as a supplementary
argument may assist in influencing an undecided court. 48
required to wear stun belt).
141. 551 S.E.2d 620 (Va. 2001).
142. See Remington, 551 S.E.2d at 635-37 (addressing incident where defendantwas unavailable
in court during jury deliberations because he had been shocked accidentally).
143. See id. (addressing only constitutional concerns of lack of defendant's presence in
courtroom). The Supreme Court of Virginia determined that Remington did not have a
constitutional right to be present because he waived his right to that claim when his counsel agreed
to allow the jury to continue in Remington's absence. Id. at 636. The court also added that
Remington would have been in custody during the proceedings anyway. Id.
144. See id.
145. Press Release, U.N. CAT, HR/4472, Committee Against Torture Concludes Twenty-
Fourth Session 9 (May 22, 2000), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/
20000522.hr4472.doc.html [hereinafter U.N. Press Release].
146. See Ham v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1243 (10th Cir. 2002) (stating that defendant alleged
that death penalty imposed on defendant who was a juvenile at time of offense violatedjus cOgens
norms of international law).
147. See id.
148. See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2249 n.21 (2002) (noting that "within the world
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According to Amnesty International, the United States was one of only two
countries that utilized stun belts in 1999.141 The United Nations Special Rappor-
teur on Torture expressed concern specifically about "the use of practices such
as chain gangs, of instruments of restraint in court and of stun belts and stun
guns, some of which can only be intended to be afflictive and degrading, others
of which have the same effect."' ° In 2000, the United Nations Committee
Against Torture recommended that the United States end its use of stun belts.''
The United States responded by claiming, in a clearly untrue statement, that stun
belts are only used for prisoner transport."2
Worldwide, the use of any kind of electro-shock equipment is banned in
most countries." 3 The United States, however, remains active not only in using
such equipment, but also in exporting it."s Although the United States is not a
signatory to any international agreement on the use of stun belts, clearly it strays
from the policies of the vast majority of nations.
I7. Steps to Take If the Belt Might Be or Is Used
"If I sneezed the wrong way, that belt would react... [I feared] giving
off the demeanor that I was guilty."' 55
A defense lawyer cannot underestimate the importance of investigation
community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded
offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved"). Courts, however, often will interpret international
norms arguments in the broadest sense. See Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 371 (6th Cit. 2001)
(stating that international agreements create binding obligations between international parties, but
that international law does not forbid capital punishment). Some courts will not be influenced in
any way by an international norms argument. See Hain, 287 F.3d at 1244 ("Even if the abolition
of the death penalty for juveniles could be considered a 'customary norm of international law' or
Yus cogens,' this does not appear to be a sufficient basis to invalidate Hain's death sentences.').
149. Crudey in Control, supra note 11, at 29. South Africa, a country with a reputation for
torture and ill-treatment of prisoners, was the other country. Id. at 29 n.63.
150. Id. at 42 (quoting U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, 203, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/38 (1997)).
151. U.N. Press Release, supra note 145, at 1 9.
152. Anne-Marie Cusac, U.N. Calle on the U.S. to Aboish Torture Deices, THE PROGRESSIVE-
MEDIA PROJECT, May 25, 2000, availabk at http://www.progressive.org/mpdvac00.htm. The
statement was made by Harold Koh, the human rights official in the Clinton administration. Id.
153. Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Human Rightsin the USA: WPorldLeaderin High Tech Repression
(1998), http://www.anestyusa.org/news/1998/25106798.htm (stating that electro-shock
weapons exported by United States are banned in some Western European countries and in
Canada).
154. Id.
155. Soto, supra note 75, at NC1.
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when use of a stun belt appears possible. The first step for a defense lawyer in
a potential stun belt case is to see if the defendant is or has been wearing one.'
5 6
If the institution holding the defendant in custody puts a stun belt on her,
counsel must bring such action to the attention of the court and make sure that
notice appears on the record. 57 Counsel should also look to see if a juror
possibly can perceive that the defendant is wearing a stun belt; if there is any hint
of the belt, counsel must argue that the belt is obviously prejudicial to the
defendant. 5 ' It is also important to emphasize the "alert juror" perspective-that
is, to assume that at least one juror is carefully watching and would be likely to
notice the belt. It is also important, therefore, to ensure that there is no indica-
tion that a bailiff or officer is holding the remote." 9 Counsel should object
immediately when the defendant is fitted with a stun belt regardless of the stage
of trial. 6 ° This is particularly true if the defendant has not exhibited any kind of
violent behavior in the courtroom.161 Counsel should also be aware of any
policies that the local jails may have regarding their use of belts and whether they
have an "automatic policy" of putting belts on certain types of felons. 6 '
Defense counsel should emphasize cases in which stun belts accidentally
shocked defendants and note that such "accidents" are not rare occurrences.
63
Any accidental shock that occurs in front of a jury is sure to cause prejudice and
would require either a mistrial or an overturned conviction on appeal. The
combination of the high rate of accidental shockings and the potential for
reversal may convince the court to examine other options more thoroughly.
Counsel should also point out that even a completely hidden belt has prejudicial
effects on the defendant because it will substantially affect the defendant's
mindset during her testimony. Most of all, if the defendant is so wary of the stun
belt that she is unable or unwilling to confer with her counsel, she is being
prejudiced in an extreme manner.
156. Defense attorneys must keep in mind that the stun belt is designed to avoid detection
by the jury and that a defendant may not immediately inform her counsel that she is wearing the
belt.
157. See Feger, 955 P.2d at 874 (holding that determination to impose restraints must come
from court and not from bailiff or sheriff's office).
158. See id. at 873 (stating that two jurors admitted that they "noticed the shock box on Mr.
Flieger's back and were discussing it").
159. See id. (stating that juror said he saw sheriff holding something which he thought was
related to device worn by Flieger).
160. See Remington, 551 S.E.2d at 635-36 (finding that defendant was not prejudiced by
accidental shock that sent him to hospital during jury deliberations because defense counsel did not
object to proceeding with jury deliberations and because defendant did not have absolute right to
be present in courtroom during jury deliberations).
161. See Mar, 52 P.3d at 100 (stating that Mar was fitted for stun belt after uneventful first day
of trial).
162. See Ho/lawaj, 6 P.3d at 994 n.4 (stating that jail was testing new stun belt by "routinely
putting it on first-degree murder defendants").
163. See infra Part III (discussing "accidental" discharges).
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In capital cases, defense counsel must assert explicitly that the defendant's
fundamental rights cannot be abridged. 64 Counsel must be aware of any stun
belt issues at the sentencing phase or the guilt phase. 6 ' The issue of prejudice
is most crucial for capital defendants because their lives are at stake; capital
defense attorneys are encouraged to resist strongly any proposed form of re-
straint on their clients.
At a minimum, defense counsel should assert that the court must hold a
hearing unless it immediately forbids the use of a stun belt.'66 Counsel should
cite Mar to indicate that any effect on the defendant's mental state requires a
hearing to determine whether a stun belt at least meets the requirements of other
forms of physical restraint.'67 If the case is before a federal court, the Eleventh
Circuit standard creates a solid framework on which defense attorneys may
rely. 6 ' Finally, if necessary, counsel should do a careful balancing test to deter-
mine whether another form of restraint, such as shackles, or stun belts would be
more prejudicial to the jury. While capital defense attorneys should argue against
the use of stun belts as much as possible, if there appears to be no way to avoid
all forms of restraint, then the attorney must decide which form of restraint is
least likely to influence the jury to convict and vote for death.'69
1/II. Concluion
Stun belts, despite what some courts will say, are still unreliable sources of
restraint. The number of "accidental" activations is too high, and the conse-
quences of the activations are too tolling, both physically and legally, for stun
belts to be a part of American jurisprudence. Courts that consider only the
"visibility" aspect of restraints must consider seriously the psychological effects
of stun belts on a person's defense.
Even general rules have been lacking for the use of stun belts in the last ten
years. Fortunately, in recent years, state and federal courts have begun to address
the issue. Even more fortunately, several of the courts have determined that the
164. See DurhamI, 287 F.3d at 1309 (stressing importance of defendant's constitutional rights).
165. See Holloway, 6 P.3d at 994 (stating that stun belt was activated during prosecutor's closing
arguments for penalty phase of trial).
166. See Mar, 52 P.3d at 113-14 (holding that trial court must make specific findings of
.'manifest need" before approving use of stun belt).
167. Seeid. at 112.
168. Seegeneral Durham I, 287 F.3d at 1297 (requiring trial court to make specific findings and
prosecution to meet heavy burden before ordering use of stun belt on defendant). Perhaps of equal
importance, a defense attorney can dissuade a court or prosecutor from using stun belts by
indicating that Durham II tried to meet the Durham I standard by conducting a five-hour hearing.
See Durham II, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 1241 (stating that hearing on Durham's motion to prohibit use
of stun belt took five hours).
169. In an interesting twist, one judge ordered bailiffs to replace a stun belt with shackles
because the judge feared that he would need to shock the defendant in order to control him. Judge
Forces Shackks on Ng During Hearing, CONTRA COSTA TiMES, Mar. 5, 1999, at A1O.
2003]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
stun belt is too dangerous, too mistake-prone, too prejudicial, or all of the above,
and have consequently banned or severely restricted its use.
Stun belts are marketed as, and are, psychological dominators. They act as
torture devices. At least until they are studied more in detail and until they are
failsafe, they have no place in a courtroom.
I was required by my accusers to wear a security belt which totally
destroyed my ability to understand the proceedings due to the mental
stress and strain of concentrating on the 50,000 volts of electricity
contained in the stunning device of the belt ... I was constantly
worried that if I were to move my hands or body in the wrong man-
ner, my accusers who controlled the activator button could have at
their discretion kill [sic] me because I do have a heart condition ... No
amount of precautions by the Court to cover up the electronic belt
with a coat for arrivals and departures by me before the jury will
eliminate the mental burden placed on me . . . To me, this mental
restraint was far worse than being beaten. The mental pain and suffer-
ing last far longer. 7'
170. Crudle in Control, supra note 11, at 20-21. Roy Melanson, the man who is quoted, was
convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison. Id. at 21.
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